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Acronyms
• Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
• Block random access memory (BRAM)
• Block Triple Modular Redundancy (BTMR)
• Clock (CLK or CLKB)
• Combinatorial logic (CL)
• Configurable Logic Block (CLB)
• Digital Signal Processing Block (DSP)
• Distributed triple modular redundancy 
(DTMR)
• Dual interlocked cell (DICE)
• Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
• Equivalence Checking (EC)
• Error detection and correction (EDAC)
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Gate Level Netlist (EDF, EDIF, GLN)
• Global triple modular redundancy (GTMR)
• Hardware Description Language (HDL)
• Input – output (I/O)
• Linear energy transfer (LET)
• Local triple modular redundancy (LTMR)
• Look up table (LUT)
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP)
• Operational frequency (fs)
• Power on reset (POR)
• Place and Route (PR)
• Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)
• Single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
• Single event effects (SEEs)
• Single event latch-up (SEL)
• Single event transient (SET)
• Single event upset (SEU)
• Single event upset cross-section (σSEU)
• Static random access memory (SRAM)
• System on a chip (SOC)
• Temporal redundancy (TR)
• Total ionizing dose (TID)
• Windowed shift register (WSR)
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• Single Event Upsets (SEUs) in Digital Devices.
• Single Event Upsets and FPGA Configuration.
• Single Event Upsets in FPGA Data Paths.
• Fail-Safe Strategies for Critical Applications.
• Dual Redundancy:
– Lockstep and
– Separate systems.
• Cold Sparing.
• Triple modular redundancy (TMR):
– Block TMR (BTMR),
– Local TMR (LTMR),
– Distributed TMR (DTMR), and
– Global TMR (GTMR).
• Fail-Safe State Machines.
Agenda 
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SEUs in Digital Devices
Although there are many sources of FPGA malfunction, 
this presentation will focus on SEUs as a source of 
failure.
4
Single event transient: SET If an SET gets caught by a 
memory element, then it 
becomes an SEU
ionization
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SEUs versus Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
• Commonly confused.
• TID: 
– cumulative damage of the semiconductor lattice (lattice 
displacement damage) caused by ionizing radiation over the 
exposition time. 
– It is measured in rads and causes gradual degradation of device 
performance.
– In other words, TID is dose that can cause device failure from 
exposure to ionizing particles (mostly protons and electrons) 
over time.
• SETs and SEUs have nothing to do with dose over time.  
– One particle’s passage through a sensitive region of a device.
– Causes ionization and can cause a transistor to change it’s 
state.
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How SEUs Affect FPGAs
• SEU and SET error signatures vary between FPGA devices:
– Temporary glitch (transient),
– Change of state (in correct state machine transitions),
– Global upsets: Loss of clock or unexpected reset,
– Route breakage (no signal can get through), and
– Configuration corruption.
• The question is how to avoid system failure and the answer 
depends on the following:
– The system’s requirements and the definition of failure,
– The target device and its surrounding circuitry susceptibility,
– Implemented fail-safe strategies,
– Reliable design practices,
– Radiation environment, and
– Trade space and decided risk.
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SEU Testing is required in order to characterize the 
σSEUs for each of FPGA categories.
FPGA SEU Categorization as Defined 
by NASA Goddard REAG:
Design σSEU Configuration σSEU Functional logic 
σSEU
SEFI σSEU
Sequential and 
Combinatorial 
logic (CL) in 
data path
Global Routes 
and Hidden 
Logic
SEU cross section: σSEU
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Preliminary Design Considerations for 
Mitigation And Trade Space
• Does the designer need to add 
mitigation?
• Will there be compromises?
– Performance and speed,
– Power,
– Schedule
– Mitigating the susceptible 
components?
– Reliability (working and mitigating 
as expected)?
Determine Most Susceptible Components:
Impact to speed, power, area, reliability, and 
schedule are important questions to ask.
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Single Event Upsets and FPGA 
Configuration
Pconfiguration+P(fs)functionalLogic+PSEFI
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Programmable Switch Implementation and 
SEU Susceptibility
ANTIFUSE (one time programmable)
SRAM (reprogrammable)
10
To be presented by Melanie D. Berg at the to 2016 Single Event Effects Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices 
Combined Workshop La Jolla, CA, May 23-26, 2016.
Configuration SEU Test Results and 
the REAG FPGA SEU Model
FPGA 
Configuration
Type
REAG Model
Antifuse
SRAM (non-
mitigated)
Flash
Hardened SRAM
( ) SEFILogicfunctionalerror PfsPfsP +∝ )(
( ) ionConfiguraterror PfsP ∝
( ) SEFILogicfunctionalerror PfsPfsP +∝ )(
( ) SEFILogicfunctionalionConfiguraterror PfsPPfsP ++∝ )(
( ) SEFILogicfunctionalionConfiguraterror PfsPPfsP ++∝ )(
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What Does The Last Slide Mean?
FPGA 
Configuration 
Type
Susceptibility
Data-path: Combinatorial Logic (CL) and Flip-flops (DFFs); 
Global: Clocks and Resets;
Configuration
Antifuse Configuration has been designated as hard regarding SEEs.  
Susceptibilities only exist in the data paths and global routes.  
However, global routes are hardened and have a low SEU 
susceptibility.
SRAM (non-
mitigated)
Configuration has been designated as the most susceptible portion 
of circuitry.  All other upsets (except for global routes) are too 
statistically insignificant to take into account.  E.g., it is a waste of 
time to study data path transients, however clock transient studies 
are significant.
Flash Configuration has been designated as hard (but NOT immune) regarding 
SEEs.  Susceptibilities also exist in the data paths and global routes (e.g., 
clocks and resets).  
Hardened
SRAM
Configuration has been designated as hardened (but NOT hard) 
regarding SEEs.  Susceptibilities also exist in the data paths and 
global routes (e.g., clocks and resets).  
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Example: Routing Configuration 
Upsets in a Xilinx Virtex FPGA
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Look Up Table: 
LUT
Because multiple paths can pass through the routing matrix, this 
configuration can be catestrophic – i.e., break simple mitigation
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Fixing SRAM-based 
Configuration…Scrubbing Definition
• From SEU testing, it has been shown that the 
configuration memory of radiation un-hardened 
SRAM-Based FPGAs is highly susceptible to 
SEUs.
• We address configuration susceptibility via 
scrubbing: Scrubbing is the act of simultaneously 
writing into FPGA configuration memory as the 
device’s functional logic area is operating with 
the intent of correcting configuration memory bit 
errors.
Configuration scrubbing only pertains to 
SRAM-based configuration devices.
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Warning!
• Fixing a configuration bit does not mean that you 
have fixed the state in the functional logic path.
• In order to guarantee that the functional logic is 
in the expected state after the configuration bit is 
fixed, either the state must be restored or a reset 
must be issued. 
Reliably getting to an expected state after a 
configuration-bit SEU (that affects the design’s 
functionality) requires one of the following:
– Fix configuration bit + (reset or correct DFFs) or
– Full reconfiguration.
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Example: Routing Configuration 
Upsets in a Xilinx Virtex FPGA
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Look Up Table: 
LUT
Configuration + design state must be corrected after a configuration 
SEU hit.
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Single Event Upsets in an FPGA’s Functional 
Data Path and Fail-Safe Strategies
Pconfiguration+P(fs)functionalLogic+PSEFI
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Data-path SEUs and Their Affect At The 
System Level
• A system implemented in an FPGA is a 
cascade of sequential and combinatorial 
logic.
• The occurrence of an SET or SEU does not 
definitively cause system error.
• Probability of a system error due to an 
SEU depends on many factors:
– Probability of fault generation in a gate (SET or 
SEU).
– Probability of error propagation – will the SET 
or SEU force the system’s next state to be 
incorrect?
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Probability of Error Propagation in A 
Data-Path
SEUs usually occur between clock cycles: They can 
cause a system-level malfunction if the SET or SEU 
will force the system’s next state to be incorrect.
• Capacitive filtration: data-path capacitance can stop 
transient upset propagation; e.g.: 
– Routing metal or heavy loading.  
– If a transient doesn’t reach a sequential element, then it most 
likely will not cause a system upset.
• Logic masking: 
– Redundancy and mitigation of paths can stop upset propagation.
– Turned off paths from gated logic can stop upset propagation.
• Temporal delay: path delays can block temporary SEUs 
from disturbing next state calculation.
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Fail-safe Strategies for Single Event 
Upsets (SEUs)
• The following slides will demonstrate commonly used 
mitigation strategies for FPGA devices.
• What you should learn:
– The differences between mitigation strategies.
– Strengths and weaknesses of various strategies.
– Questions to ask or considerations to make when 
evaluating mitigation schemes.
– Which mitigation schemes are best for various 
types of FPGA devices.
• The scope of this presentation will cover fail-safe 
strategies for configuration and data-path SEUs
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Goal for critical applications: 
Limit the probability of system error 
propagation and/or provide 
detection-recovery mechanisms via 
fail-safe strategies. 
Fail-Safe Strategies for FPGA 
Critical Applications
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Differentiating Fail-Safe Strategies:
• Detection:
– Watchdog (state or logic monitoring).
– Can range from simplistic checking to complex Decoding.
– Action (alerting, correction, or recovery).
• Masking (does not mean correction):
– Preventing error propagation to other logic.  
– Requires redundancy + mitigation or detection.
– Turn off faulty path.
• Correction (error may not be masked):
– Error state (memory) is changed/fixed.
– Need feedback or new data flush cycle.
• Recovery:
– Bring system to a deterministic state.
– Might include correction.
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Redundancy Is Not Enough
• Simply adding redundancy to a system is not enough 
to assume that the system is well protected.
• Questions/Concerns that must be addressed for a 
critical system expecting redundancy to cure all (or 
most):
– How is the redundancy implemented?
– What portions of your system are protected? Does the 
protection comply with the results from radiation testing?
– Is detection of malfunction required to switch to a redundant 
system or to recover?
– If detection is necessary, how quickly can the detection be 
performed and responded to?
– Is detection enough?... Does the system require correction?
Listed are crucial concerns that should be addressed at 
design reviews and prior to design implementation
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Mitigation
• Error Masking vs. Error Correction… there’s a 
difference.
• Mitigation can be:
– User inserted: part of the actual design process.
• User must verify mitigation… Complexity is a RISK!!!!!!!!
– Embedded: built into the device library cells.
• User does not verify the mitigation – manufacturer does.
• Mitigation should reduce error…
– Generally through redundancy.
– Incorrect implementation can increase error.
– Overly complex mitigation cannot be verified and 
incurs too high of a risk to implement.
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Questions to Ask: 
Availability versus Correct Operation
• Requirements must be satisfied.  Is there a 
metric for mitigation trade-offs and risks 
regarding system requirements?
• What is your expected up-time versus down-
time (availability)?
• Is correct operation well defined?  E.g., correct 
operation can be defined as working as 
expected through error states after an SEU 
strike… however, this must be clearly stated in 
requirements.
• Is system failure well defined? 
• Can availability and correct operation be 
deterministic regardless of error signature?
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Detection and Recovery
• Not all mitigation schemes require detection.
• Questions/Considerations – important review 
questions:
– If your scheme requires detection:
• Can the system detect all types of error signatures?
• Can the system detect all error signatures fast 
enough?
• Do different errors require different recovery 
schemes… can the system accommodate.
– How are you going to verify the detection and 
recovery?
– How much downtime will there be during recovery?
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how and if the scheme has been verified!
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Embedded Mitigation versus User 
Inserted Mitigation
27
Dual Interlocked Cell (DICE) Localized Triple Modular 
Redundancy (LTMR)
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Radiation Hardened (per SEU) versus 
Commercial FPGA Devices
• A radiation hardened (per SEU) device is a device that 
has embedded mitigation.
• Radiation hardened FPGA devices are available to 
users.  They make the design cycle much easier!
• SEU mitigation is generally applied to the following:
– Data-path elements:
• Localized redundancy inserted into library cell flip-flops 
(DFFs).
– Localized Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR) or
– Dual interlocked Cell (DICE)
• SET filters inserted on the DFF data input pin.
• SET filters inserted on the DFF clock input pin.
– Global routes.
– Memory cells.
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Localized Redundancy Embedded in 
the DFF Cells
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Dual Interlocked Cell (DICE) Localized Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR)
Xilinx Microsemi
Warning! These figures are simplified schematics of the actual 
implementation.
Problem! Although DFFs are protected, SETs from the 
combinatorial logic in the data path and SETs in the global 
routes can cause incorrect data to be captured by the DFF.
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Combinatorial 
logic data path TR Filter
Embedded Temporal Redundancy (TR): SET 
Filtration in The Data Path
DFF
• Temporal Filter placed directly before DFF.
• Localized scheme that reduces SET capture in the data path.
• Delays must be well controlled.  
– Every delay path shall consistently have a predefined delay and must 
be verified.
• Do not implement TR as a user inserted mitigation scheme. Delay 
must be deterministic and it is too difficult to manage with place 
and route tools.
• Maximum Clock frequency is reduced by the amount of new delay.
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Embedded Radiation Hardened Global Routes:
SET Filtration in The Global Route Path
• Some FPGAs contain 
radiation-hardened clock 
trees and other global routes 
(Microsemi products only).
• Global structures are 
generally hardened by using 
larger buffers.
• TR has also been used on 
the lowest leaves of the 
clock trees… (Xilinx V5QV 
only).
Clock Tree
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many devices do not have hardened global routes.
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Radiation Hardened versus Commercial FPGA 
Device Geometries And Gate Count
As Geometries Get Smaller, More Gates Are Available for Mitigation
= SEU Hardened/Harder 
0 1 2 3 4 5
RTAX-S
RT-ProASIC
Virtex 4QV and Virtex 4
Virtex 5QV
Virtex 5
Stratix 5
Virtex-7Q
Virtex-7
Kintex UltraScale
Virtex UltraScale
Kintex UltraScale+
Virtex UltraScale+
Logic Capacity - Millions
150nm
130nm
90nm
65nm
28nm
20nm
16nm
Courtesy of Synopsys
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FPGA Devices Listed by Configuration Type 
(Not All Are Included in The List): Susceptibility
Configuration Type Short List of 
Device Families
Embedded 
Mitigation
Most Susceptible 
Components
SRAM Stratix, Virtex, 
Kintex
No Configuration
Antifuse RTAX, RTSXS DFFs and clocks 
(configuration is 
already hardened by 
nature)
Combinatorial logic 
(however 
susceptibility
considered low)
Flash ProASIC3 Configuration is 
already hardened by 
nature.
DFFs and clocks
Hardened SRAM Virtex V5QV Configuration + 
DICE DFFs + SET 
filters
Clocks.  In some 
cases additional 
mitigation may be 
necessary for 
configuration and 
DFFs
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websites, and other space agency sites for more 
information on SEU data and total ionizing dose data.
DFF: flip flop DICE: Dual interlocked Cell
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User Inserted Mitigation
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Dual Redundant Systems
(Detection Systems)
Lockstep Duplicate Systems 
versus
Two separate systems
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Dual Redundancy
• Dual redundant systems cannot correct (roll-back is an 
exception); they can only detect.
• “Compare and Alert” systems must be highly reliable 
and verifiable.
• Generally not all I/O can be monitored or compared.
• Best used for data calculation and manipulation… 
easiest to place compares on data buses.
36
Complex System
Complex System
Compare
Alert, Mask,
And Recover
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Lockstep Dual Redundancy
• For a lockstep, the dual complex systems are exact duplicates.
• Synchronization is necessary.  It is challenging and sometimes 
unpredictable.  If not well managed, availability is affected.
– Cache misses.
– Care must be taken to synchronize asynchronous inputs (e.g., 
interrupts).
– Complex algorithms for pipelining or memory management must 
be controlled for data to be exact duplicates and in lockstep. 
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Lockstep Compare
• Best to use a “ data valid signal” to indicate data are ready 
for compare.
• System performance can be affected because of data 
synchronization at the comparator.
• Halt control will be necessary in case of “out-of-sync” data.
• Should the comparator be hardened?
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Lockstep Alert, Mask, and Recover
• Masking must be instantaneous.
• Where will the alert go upon a miscompare?
– Internal or external device (watchdog).
• What will be the system response to an alert?
– Full reset versus partial resets.
– FPGA (full reconfigure).
– Power cycle.
– Roll-back (correction) is an option.  However, complex and 
unreliable.
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Two Separate Systems Dual 
Redundancy
• Relaxes the system synchronization requirements of 
being in lockstep.
• Compares operate on valid signals and/or message 
passing.  Compares are generally more complex.
• Two separate systems can be complex to manage: 
– Data reordering (e.g., pipelining) must be managed.
– System halts must be carefully managed.
• If not well managed, system performance and 
availability will be significantly affected.
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Complex System A
Complex System B
Compare
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Elongation of System Operation:
Cold Sparing
41
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Cold Sparing
• One active system and alternate inactive systems.
• Upon active system failure, an inactive system is turned 
on.
• System operation is able to be elongated after failure.
• However:
– Availability is not improved… there is downtime.
– Can your system afford the downtime (critical application)?
– How clean is the system switch over?
– How long is the system switch over.
• Can the system ping-pong between active and inactive 
systems or is a system considered dead after failure?
– Ping-ponging can be used for systems that have a low 
probability of destructive failures.
– Ping-ponging can be complex and can affect availability.
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System versus Design Mitigation
• The previous slides were affiliated with system level 
mitigation.
• System level mitigation generally has:
– Detection, masking, no correction, downtime, and recovery 
actions.
• The following slides will discuss triple modular 
redundancy (TMR) techniques that can be 
implemented as system or design-level mitigation.
• Most of the TMR techniques will incorporate masking 
and detection with no downtime (unless there is a 
single functional interrupt (SEFI)). 
• Hence, TMR can improve system performance, 
availability, and elongate operation time.
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Mitigation – Fail Safe Strategies That 
Do Not Require Fault Detection but 
Provide SEU Masking and/or 
Correction: 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)… 
best two out of three.
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How To Insert TMR into A Design:
FPGA User Design Flow
Create 
Configuration
Place and Route
Output of 
synthesis is a 
gate netlist that 
represents the 
given HDL 
function.
Functional 
Specification
HDL
Synthesis
HDL: Hardware description language
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TMR can be 
inserted during 
synthesis or post 
synthesis.
If inserted post 
synthesis, the gate 
level netlist is 
replicated, ripped 
apart, and voters + 
feedback are 
inserted.
TMR can be written 
into the HDL.  
Generally not done 
because too 
difficult.
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Local Mitigation versus Distributed or 
Global Mitigation
• Local mitigation: 
– Only DFFs are mitigated.
– Mitigation will include masking and potential correction 
at the DFF.
– Used with systems where DFFs are the most susceptible 
component cells.
• Distributed or global mitigation:
– The full design is mitigated with masking and 
correction.
• Depending on the target device, the clock tree 
and other global routes may also need hardening. 
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Various TMR Schemes: Different Topologies
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Block diagram of block 
TMR (BTMR): a complex 
function containing 
combinatorial logic (CL) 
and flip-flops (DFFs) is 
triplicated as three 
black boxes; majority 
voters are placed at the 
outputs of the triplet. 
Block diagram of local 
TMR (LTMR): only flip-
flops (DFFs) are 
triplicated and data-
paths stay singular; 
voters are brought into 
the design and placed 
in front of the DFFs. 
Block Diagram of 
distributed TMR (DTMR): 
the entire design is 
triplicated except for the 
global routes (e.g., clocks); 
voters are brought into the 
design and placed after the 
flip-flops (DFFs).  DTMR 
masks and corrects most 
single event upsets (SEUs). 
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TMR Implementation
• As previously illustrated, TMR can be implemented in a 
variety of ways.
• The definition of TMR depends on what portion of the 
circuit is triplicated and where the voters are placed.
• The strongest TMR implementation will triplicate all 
data-paths and contain separate voters for each data-
path.
– However, this can be costly: area, power, and 
complexity.
– Hence a trade is performed to determine the TMR 
scheme that requires the least amount of effort and 
circuitry that will meet project requirements.
• Presentation scope: Block TMR (BTMR), Localized TMR 
(LTMR), Distributed TMR (DTMR), Global TMR (GTMR).
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Block Triple Modular Redundancy: BTMR
• Need Feedback to Correct
• Cannot apply internal correction from voted outputs
• If blocks are not regularly flushed (e.g. reset), Errors 
can accumulate – may not be an effective technique
V
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T
I
N
G
M
A
T
R
I
X
Complex 
function 
with 
DFFs
Can Only 
Mask 
Errors
3x the error rate with 
triplication and no 
correction/flushing
Copy 1
Copy 2
Copy 3
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Examples of a Flushable BTMR 
Designs
• Shift Registers.
• Transmission channels:  It is typical for 
transmission channels to send and reset after 
every sent packet.
• Systems that can be reset (or power-cycled) 
every so-often.
Voter
TRANSMIT
TRANSMIT
TRANSMIT
RESET
Transmission channel example:
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If The System Is Not Flushable, Then 
BTMR May Not Provide The Expected 
Level of Mitigation
• BTMR can work well as a mitigation 
scheme if the expected MTTF for each 
module is much greater than the expected 
time-window of correct operation.
• But… If the expected time to failure for one 
block is close to the expected time-window 
of correct operation, then BTMR doesn’t 
buy you anything. 
• If not thought out well, BTMR can actually 
be a detriment – complexity, power, and 
area, and false sense of performance. 
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Explanation of BTMR Strength and Weakness 
using Classical Reliability Models
Relibility for 1 
block (Rblock)
Relibility for 
BTMR (RBTMR)
Mean Time to 
Failure for 1 
block (MTTFblock)
Mean Time to 
Failure BTMR 
(MTTFBTMR)
e- λt 3 e- 2λt-2 e- 3λt 1/ λ (5/6 λ)= 0.833/λ
Operating a BTMR 
design in this time 
interval will provide 
an increase in 
reliability.
However, over time, 
BTMR reliability drops 
off faster than a 
system with No TMR.
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BTMR Bottom Line
• How long does your BTMR system need to 
operate relative to the MTTF for one of its 
unmitigated blocks?
• Overtime, a BTMR system has lower reliability 
than an unmitigated system.
• Adding more replicated blocks (e.g., N-out-of-M) 
system will only increase the reliability during the 
short window near start time.  However, overtime, 
the reliability of an N-out-of-M system will fall 
faster as M (the number of replicated blocks) 
grows.
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What Should be Done If Availability 
Needs to be Increased?
• If the blocks within the BTMR have a relatively high upset 
rate with respect to the availability window, then stronger 
mitigation must be implemented.
• Bring the voting/correcting inside of the modules… bring 
the voting to the module DFFs.
The following slides illustrate the various forms of TMR that 
include voter insertion in the data-path.
TMR 
Nomenclature
Description TMR 
Acronym
Local TMR DFFs are triplicated LTMR
Distributed TMR DFFs and CL-data-paths are 
triplicated
DTMR
Global TMR DFFs, CL-data-paths and global 
routes are triplicated
GTMR or 
XTMR
DFF: Edge triggered flip-flop; CL: Combinatorial Logic
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P(fs)error Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
Describing Mitigation Effectiveness Using 
A Model
∝
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU
Probability that an 
SEU in a DFF will 
manifest as an error 
in the next system 
clock cycle
Probability that an 
SET in a CL gate will 
manifest as an error 
in the next system 
clock cycle
DFF: Edge triggered flip-flop CL: Combinatorial Logic
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P(fs)error  Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
Local Triple Modular Redundancy (LTMR)
∝
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU0
Comb
Logic
Voter
Voter
Voter
LTMR
Comb
Logic
Comb
Logic
DFF
DFF
DFF
• Only DFFs are triplicated.  Data-paths are kept singular.
• LTMR masks upsets from DFFs and corrects DFF upsets if feedback is 
used.
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• Good for devices where DFFs are most 
susceptible and configuration and  CL 
susceptibility is insignificant; e.g., 
Microsemi ProASIC3.
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Windowed Shift Registers (WSRs): 
NEPP Test Structure
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Adding LTMR to a Microsemi ProASIC3 
Device versus RTAXs Embedded LTMR
• At lower LETs, applying LTMR to a 
ProASIC3 design, has similar (a 
little higher) SEU response to 
Microsemi RTAXs series.
• At higher LETs, clock tree upsets 
start to dominate and LTMR in the 
ProASIC3 is not as effective.  
• Depending on your target radiation 
environment, for most critical 
applications, the ProASIC3 SEU 
responses will produce acceptable 
upset rates.
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Embedded LTMR 
in a RTAXs           
DFF cell.
LET: linear energy transfer.
WSR: Test circuit…Windowed Shift Register.
INV: Inverters between WSR stages.
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RTAX4000D INV=8
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LTMR Should Not Be Used in An 
SRAM Based FPGA
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
I1 I2 I3 I4
LUT
Look Up Table: 
LUT
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SEU data for LTMR in Xilinx FPGA devices similar or worse 
than no added mitigation.
To be presented by Melanie D. Berg at the to 2016 Single Event Effects Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices 
Combined Workshop La Jolla, CA, May 23-26, 2016.
Distributed Triple Modular Redundancy (DTMR)
DTMR
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
P(fs)error Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU
∝ Low Minimally Lowered
0 Low
Comb 
Logic
Comb 
Logic
Comb 
Logic
DFF
DFF
DFF
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• Triple all data-paths and add voters after DFFs.
• DTMR masks upsets from configuration + DFFs + CL and corrects 
captured upsets if feedback is used.
• Good for devices where configuration or DFFs + CL are more 
susceptible than project requirements; e.g., Xilinx and Altera 
commercial FPGAs.
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P(fs)error Pconfiguration + P(fs)functionalLogic + PSEFI
Global Triple Modular Redundancy (GTMR)
P(fs)DFFSEU →SEU + P(fs)SET→SEU
∝
Low Lowered
Comb
Logic
GTMR Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter
Voter Voter
Voter
Voter
DFF
DFF
DFFComb 
Logic
Comb 
Logic
Low Low
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• Triple all clocks, data-paths and add voters after DFFs.
• GTMR has the same level of protection as DTMR; however, it also 
protects clock domains.
• Good for devices where configuration or DFFs + CL are more 
susceptible than project requirements; e.g., Xilinx and Altera 
commercial FPGAs.
Low
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Theoretically, GTMR Is The Strongest 
Mitigation Strategy… BUT…
• Triplicating a design and its global routes takes up a 
lot of power and area.
• Generally performed after synthesis by a tool– not 
part of RTL.
• Skew between clock domains must be minimized such 
that it is less than the feedback of a voter to its 
associated DFF:
– Does the FPGA contain enough low skew clock 
trees? (each clock + its synchronized reset)x3.
– Limit skew of clocks coming into the FPGA.
– Limit skew of clocks from their input pin to their 
clock tree.
• Difficult to verify.
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Computer Aided Design Tools and 
TMR Insertion
• Tools are available for LTMR (Synopsys).
• Currently no commercial tools are ready for DTMR and 
GTMR.
– DTMR and GTMR are not implemented as expected with 
Synopsys.
– Provided poor SEU results.
– Xilinx provides a tool (XTMR).  Can be used with Xilinx FPGA 
devices for DTMR and GTMR but: 
• The tool has not been proven outside of the Xilinx 
consortium (reliability); 
• There are trust concerns because of university 
involvement in tool development; and
• The tool is not developed in a commercially controlled 
environment.
• Trust and reliability problems with current tool set.
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TMR and Verification
• If a system is required to be protected using triple 
modular redundancy (TMR), improper insertion 
can jeopardize the reliability and security of the 
system.  
• Due to the complexity of the verification process 
and the complexity of digital designs, there are 
currently no available techniques that can 
provide complete and reliable confirmation of 
TMR insertion.  
• Can you trust that TMR has been inserted as 
expected (correct topological scheme) and has 
not broken existing logic during the insertion 
process?
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We are working on it!
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Currently, What Are The Biggest Challenges 
Regarding Mitigation Insertion?
• Tool availability… Synopsys is not quite ready for DTMR or GTMR.
• User’s are not selecting the correct mitigation scheme for their 
target FPGA.
• Mitigation is too complex to fully verify.
FPGA Type LTMR DTMR GTMR
Antifuse+LTMR: Microsemi 
RTAX or RTSX family
Commercial SRAM: Xilinx 
and Altera devices
Commercial Flash: 
Microsemi ProASIC family
Hardened SRAM: Xilinx 
V5QV
General Recommendation
Not Recommended but may be a solution for some situations
Will not be a good solution
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User versus Embedded Mitigation
• A subset of user inserted mitigation strategies 
have been presented.
• None of the strategies are 100% fail-safe.
• Depending on the project requirements, and the 
target device’s SEU susceptibility, the most 
efficient mitigation strategy should be selected.
• In most cases, devices with embedded 
mitigation do not require additional (user 
inserted) mitigation. 
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Beware of unhardened global routes.  They do cause 
system upsets.  
V5QV (SIRF) and ProASIC3 have hardened configuration but 
do not have hardened global routes.
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Fail-Safe State Machines
67
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Synchronous FSMs and SEUs
• A synchronous FSM utilizes 
DFFs to hold its current 
state, transitions to a next 
state controlled by a clock 
edge and combinatorial 
logic, and only accepts 
inputs that have been 
synchronized to the same 
clock
• FSM SEUs can occur  from:
– Caught data-path SETs
– DFF SEUs
– Clock/Reset SETs
C
urrent S
tate
O
utputs
Inputs
Clock
Next State
• A synchronous FSM is designed to deterministically 
transition through a pattern of defined states
Synchronous 
FSM
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5-State FSM Binary Encoding Example
Example of an FSM used to control a
peripheral device
5-State FSM with each state
encoded as binary numbers.
An SEU can change current state and cause a 
catastrophic event
State 0
State 1
State 2State 3
State 4
State 0
State 1
State 2State 3
State 4
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How Do We Implement Fail-Safe 
FSMs?
• Question:  A designer states that all FSMs 
have been implemented as “safe”, what do 
you expect?
• Correction? Detection? Masking?
– What does correction mean?
– All mitigation shall be defined unambiguously 
by the requirements and by the designer.
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Safe State Machines
• As currently defined by design tools and by some 
designers, the term “safe” state machine is a misnomer.  
• Auto transitioning (“safe state-machine” ) is a reaction to 
a small subset of incorrect transitions (unmapped states).  
They do not correct or mask (protect) against incorrect 
transitioning.  
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State Mapped or
Unmapped
000 Yes
001 Yes
010 Yes
011 Yes
100 Yes
101 No
110 No
111 No
What happens if 
an SEU causes a 
transition from 
“001” to “101” ?
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Safe State Machines: What happens if an 
SEU causes a transition from “001” to 
“101” ?
• As currently implemented, a “safe” state machine will 
automatically transition to a reset (or “safe” state).  
• Problem: this could be detrimental to your system
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State Mapped or
Unmapped
000 Yes
001 Yes
010 Yes
011 Yes
100 Yes
101 No
110 No
111 No
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Problems with Current “Safe” FSM 
Definition
• Sounds more safe than 
what it really is.
• Does not do anything for 
incorrect transitions into 
mapped states.
• Does not correct the state:
– Something that is supposed to 
be on will abruptly shut off.
– Other FSMs or control logic 
can become unsynchronized 
with the bad FSM; with or 
without the automated jump to 
a “safe” state.
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Can Auto-transitioning Work for Your 
Mission?
74
• Auto-transitioning can work if 
incorrect sequencing of your FSM 
will not cause system failure; e.g. 
mathematical logic control.
• Auto-transitioning can be 
acceptable if it is used in 
conjunction with a detection flag.  
The detection flag must propagate 
to all necessary logic.
• But remember, there is no 
protection or detection with auto-
transitioning when incorrectly 
transitioning to a mapped state.
Auto-transitioning + detection is available with computer 
aided design (CAD) tools.
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Implementing Corrective Logic for FSMs
• ASICs or FPGAs with hardened configuration:
– LTMR: Triplicate each DFF and use a majority voter.  
• The triplication + voter is treated as one DFF
• Encoding doesn’t change
• Resultant FSM has 3 times the number of DFFs 
than the original encoding scheme.
• Combinatorial logic (not including the voters) 
does not change
– Hamming Code-3: requires a new encoding scheme.
• FPGAs with commercial SRAM configuration: 
DTMR is suggested.
There are computer aided design tools (CAD) that can 
assist in adding all of the above mitigation strategies.
Be careful regarding unhardened (per SEU) global routes.
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A closer look at a base-state
(state 0) and its companion-
states
Hamming Code-3 FSM Diagram for a 5 
Base-State FSM: Would need 5*7=35 
FSM states to be represented… 6 DFFs
State 0
State 1
State 2State 3
State 4
FSM Fault Tolerance: 
5-State Conversion to a Hamming Code-3 FSM
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Some Thoughts
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Concerns and Challenges of Today 
and Tomorrow for Mitigation Insertion
• User insertion of mitigation strategies in most FPGA and ASIC 
devices has proven to be a challenging task because of reliability, 
performance, area, and power constraints.
– Difficult to synchronize across triplicated systems,
– Mitigation insertion slows down the system.
– Can’t fit a triplicated version of a design into one device.
– Power and thermal hot-spots are increased.
• The newer devices have a significant increase in gate count and 
lower power.  This helps to accommodate for area and power 
constraints while triplicating a design.  However, this increases the 
challenge of module synchronization.
• Embedded mitigation has helped in the design process.  However, it 
is proving to be an ever-increasing challenge for manufacturers.
– We (users) want embedded systems: cheaper, faster, and less power 
hungry.
– However, heritage has proven that for critical applications, embedded 
systems have provided excellent performance and reliability.
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Summary
• For critical applications, mitigation may be required.
• Determine the correct mitigation scheme for your mission while 
incorporating given requirements:
– Understand the susceptibility of the target FPGA and 
potential necessity of other devices.
– Investigate if the selected mitigation strategy is compatible to 
the target FPGA device.
– Calculate the reliability of the mitigation strategy to determine 
if the final system will satisfy requirements.
– Ask the right questions regarding functional expectation, 
mitigation, requirement satisfaction, and verification of 
expectations.
• Although it is desirable from a user’s perspective to have 
embedded mitigation, cost seems to be driving the market 
towards unmitigated commercial FPGA devices.  Hence, it will be 
necessary for user’s to familiarize themselves with optimal 
mitigation insertion and usage.
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